Sub Ratione Dei

The Monocultural Myth

Review of Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, Penguin, (2006). ISBN: 0713999381.

Amartya Sen is well known as a economist and political theorist and recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences in 1998. In this book Sen tackles the idea of identity and its link to violent conflict. Beginning on a more distinctly geopolitical level Sen discusses the potency of the clash of civilizations mode of thinking both on the more academic level (eg. Samuel Huntington) and on its more widespread appeal. The core of Sen's criticism is that such approach commit the reality of the practice of identity in the modern world is more complex than the monoculturalism the clash of civilizational paradigm assumes. While it is true that the world may be split into some major identity groups (Western, Islamic, etc) the ascription of singular identity for the millions of individuals that ascribe to these groups is naive. It is from this criticism that Sen derives his subtitle "The Illusion of Destiny", Sen convincingly argues that people cannot be boxed into a particular identity group, Muslim for example, and in doing so there beliefs about a particular issue (western decadence for example). Hence Sen writes:

In our normal lives we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups - we belong to all of them. The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, [etc] Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person's only identity or singular membership category. Given our inescapably plural identities, we have to decide on the relative importance of our different associations and affiliations in any particular context (p. xii-xiii).

We acknowledge this on a local level; therefore, why do we believe that on an international level these plural identities are not operative. Sen argues with reference to India how they do. It is clear he argues that the claims of a Muslim civilization are nonsense. Moreover, this idea of ideologically separate civilizations does not cohere with the known facts of history; there has always been global development and many of the so-called western developments (freedom, democracy, separation of Church and State) have not only been present elsewhere but have served as the impetus for their development in the West. Thus far the criticism Sen offers is fairly standard; Sen however makes an interesting development in his argument against monocultural mindset that is the foundation for the clash of civilizations. This error of ascribing singular affiliations to cultural groups is also present in those who praise other group's true essence. To take Islam as an example. Sen notes that one of the first responses to the rise in islamophobia was a rise in the "true Islam is a religion of peace" rhetoric. Sen notes that this, like the clash of civilizational approach, fails in asserting a singular attribute to a cultural affiliation that is in reality far from homogeneous. What makes Sen's argument more interesting is his later argument against what he labels plural monoculturalism. In a readable survey of the problems of multiculturalism. Whilst a discussion of tolerance and diversity is sadly kept on the periphery Sen does raise the issue that often plaques multicultural theory, that of group rights versus individual freedom. Plural monoculturalism is the theory that modern life (I was going to use the word society but for the plural monoculturalist there is no such thing) is made of of numerous cultures exist alongside but distinct and separate and sealed off from all other monocultures. There is no real interchange or dialogue, an intermutual sharing of life and learning. Instead one is left misunderstanding and a denial of that most precious right, the freedom of self-definition. Multiculturalism requires and appreciation and indeed valueing of diversity; monoculturalism can live in oblivion to it. While Sen largely dismisses multiculturalism (something I do not) his discussion is a useful criticism of some popular misconceptions of the multicultural approach. 

‘ The Daily Me ’ and the Crisis of Democracy

Review of Cass Sunstein, Republic.com, Princeton University Press, (2000). ISBN: 0691070253.

Republic.com seeks to explore the often unreflected idea that the Internet is a boon for democracy, the logic being that the explosion of ideas readily accessible has all that is necessary for a genuinely democratic society. Such free speech purists have found in Cass Suntein a significant naysayer. Sunstein's criticism is against what he has labelled "the Daily Me", or more academically the synonymity of consumer sovereignty with democratic freedom. A good example of this idea of consumer sovereignty can be found in the prophetic words-spoken in 1999 - of Bill Gates, cited at regular intervals throughout Sunstein's book:

When you turn on DirectTV and you step through every channel - well, there's three minutes of your life. When you walk into your living room six years from now, you'll be able to say what you're interested in, and have the screen help you pick out a video that you care about. It's not going to be "let's look at channels 4, 5, and 7."

As Sunstein points out, Gates' vision is a vision of "consumer sovereignty in action" (p. 44). It is this trend to consumer sovereignty that Sunstein argues endangers the democratic project. Absolute freedom to filter out news-stations, opinions, political and religious viewpoints etc with which we are not enamoured with threatens democracy because by this way the internet morphs from being the free marketplace of ideas that its defenders claim to becoming an ideological cul-de-sac. This is not just a matter of like attracting like, Sunstein's argument develops the thesis the dynamics of groups is toward extremism, a phenomenon Sunstein backs up with social scientific research. Therefore, the internet rather than being a force for democratisation is, paradoxically, an inhibiting factor in democratic praxis. In short, freedom of speech is not synonymous with consumer sovereignty and its key idea that "customers" can filter the information that comes their way. A robust theory of citizenship by contrast requires that the citizen cannot discriminate (at least not the the extent of the consumer sovereignty model - although even Locke required filtering of political views - ) from those they disagree with, the term used to describe this process is deliberative democracy. In response Sunstein offers ways in which the negative aspects of internet ideological polarisation can be minimised, with ideas ranging from voluntary agreements to governmental legislation and censorship. To be sure Sunstein has offered an interesting thesis on the relationship of new media and democracy, particularly in relation to the deliberative democratic model. It is not however the last word on the subject. For my part its major failing is Sunstein's lack of concern to which all media has been dominated by ideological polarisation. More pertinently the media, as Chomsky has shown, has always been in the pay of the government and, more importantly, the conglomerate. My reason for highlighting this is that however valid Sunstein's argument may be, it is only replacing one anti-democratic force with another (although with the staggering commercialisation of the internet perhaps in time it will be the same powers merely working in a different medium). Finally, it strikes me that Sunstein is living in a different world to me. If Sunstein's thesis were accepted in toto, - and I think he has overstated his argument - it still remains the fact that every day people go to work with people from a variety of backgrounds, cultures, religions, and political opinion. Maybe the Daily Me phenomenon has reduced the scope for ideological challenge, however, it has certainly not obliterated it. 

God in the Classroom

Review of Kent Greenawalt, Does God Belong in Public Schools? Princeton University Press, (2007). ISBN: 0691130655.

It is one of the perplexing features for foreigners such as myself looking in on US politics is the ambiguous stance toward public religion. In a country that in does not seem touched by what sociologists call the secularisation thesis with continued high church attendance and the continuing political currency of a candidate's religious faith that there should simultaneously be a witch-hunt against any public advancement of even religious faith as a generic concept – quite apart from any particular instantiations - as though supporting religion must be seen as a criticism of non-religious ways of life (which, of course, it doesn't).

In order to provide a guide to the minefield that is the US jurisprudential approach to public religion Kent Greenawalt, University Professor at Columbia University and himself Deputy Solicitor General, has written Does God Belong in Public Schools? A book that, with the exception of the Faith School debate one simply cannot imagine being written in a UK scenario.

For those wanting a thorough review of this book I would direct them to Robert's Audi's review in the Virginia Law Review (I found the discussion of the Pledge of Allegiance especially interesting and pertinent). Briefly stated however Greenawalt takes the majority of the controversies that spark in Public Schools in regard to religion; for example, the moment of silence, school prayer, teaching Intelligent Design, and the tension between the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amendment. As an intelligent introduction to the issues then Greenawalt's book is definitely recommended. However, I was hoping for a more thorough engagement with the issues, particularly the legal cases and background narrative of the major Supreme Court decisions. For a book by a law professor it was surprising the relative infrequency with which there is sustained discussion of the specific issues raised.

 

The Turbulent Decade

Sadako Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s, W W Norton, 2005.

From 1990 through to 2000 Sadako Ogata was the head of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Before that Ogata held a professorship in International Politics in Japan. The reason I mention the latter point is, to be honest, coming into the subject with a significant academic pedigree I was hoping for a more substantial analysis of the UNHCR as the UNHCR substantially changed during Ogata's term.

It would have been helpful for a more nuanced history of the organisation. Formed in 1950 the UNHCR is, with the exception of Palestinian refugees (which comes under the remit of the UNRWA), responsible for managing the internation cooperation on UN member states and plays a key role in monitoring refugee movements and providing initial humanitarian relief. The UNHCR, together with the 1951 Refugee Convention itself, began life dealing overwhelmingly with European refugees, most notably the Jewish displaced after WWII. Thereafter the Cold War ensured that  refugees were predominately European and (in the case of the US), South American. However, in the 1990s there were a number of change. The end of the Cold War put an end to the often overtly political recognition of refugees from the eastern bloc. Consequently the UNHCR focused its attention on the developing world to a far greater extent on the developing world (I hate that term).

In this book Ogata basically offers an extended survey of the UNHCR operations within the key refugee causing crises of the 1990s, namely the first Gulf War, Afghanistan, the Balkan Crisis and the Great Lakes region. As a memoir this is at times an interesting account but I must say as a professor of international politics i was really hoping for a lot more from Ogata. For example, much is made of the reasons why in the First Gulf war the UNHCR made the very significant move from managing refugee flows (which, by definition, requires the extra-territoriality of the refugee) to creating camps of Internally Displaced Persons. Not only is this an elaboration of UNHCR's traditional mandate but it represented a positive collaboration of UNHCR operations with alien (that is non-iraqi) military forces - this is a theme that Ogata reiterates as a key part of her approach in various fields of operation; yet there is very little critical comment on this highly significant trend.

This could have been an excellent book; her position, together with expertise at a time of immense change for in humanitarian operations over the decade in question should have made this a significant text - as it is, however, it's more suitable as a coffee table book the the more discerning reader. One to avoid.

The Princely Principle

Review of Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Penguin, (2003[1513]).

Machiavelli was a Florentine diplomat but, with the fall of the republic and the ascension to power of the Medici he lost his post because Machiavelli worked to maintain Florence's Republican credentials. The Prince is, in part, an attempt by Machiavelli at damage limitation and try to secure a future for himself in the new administration. However, as Machiavelli himself concedes, there was a flaw in his obsequiousness which he tried to mitigate against in his opening letter to Lorenzo de Medici:

I hope it will [not] be considered presumptuous for a man of low and humble status to dare discuss and lay down the law about how princes should rule (p. 3-4).

I am not aware that de Medici ever commented as to whether he did in fact consider Machiavelli's action presumptuous; however, the fact that Machiavelli never worked in Medici's employ again suggest that he did and one is tempted to think that given the fact that Machiavelli's thesis is that the prince is of a different character to us mere mortals then he was right to do so for in the very act of writing the book Machiavelli has to a certain extent undercut his own argument. While Machiavelli's immediate aims were unfulfilled The Prince has become one of the key texts of modern political theory. If truth be told I was perhaps expecting a little more from this book given the regularity with which Machiavelli is cited, although evidently often by those who have not read Machiavelli himself. Although not strictly separated as such there are two emphases in the text. The first, which will appeal to military strategists, is a series of observations of maintaining power over a newly obtained territory and the means by which the prince should do this. The second is an examination of the prince's relationship to the aristocracy, other neighbouring princes, the military, and the general population. What ties all these different constituencies together is the calculated disavowal of ethics. Back in 1997 the new UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook Robin Cook launched a new ethical foreign policy; at the time I remember being impressed. In it Cook promised that

Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy

A centrepiece of Machiavelli's argument is that there is not, from the Prince's perspective a necessary correlation between ethics and politics. As Anthony Grafton summarises in the introduction Machiavelli argued that "the prince could not be constrained by the demands of normal morality if he hoped to do his job properly ... Politics must have its own rules" (p. xxiii-xxiv). On the face of it, Cook et al were charting a new way from that envisaged by Machiavelli, however, on closer reflection they played a Machiavellian political strategy masterfully, the Iraq war being symptomatic of this (although, to be fair, it should be remembered that Cook resigned from the Cabinet over this issue). Machiavelli argues that the prince, even if privately generous and virtuous must always be prepared to politically divorce this ethical framework from political praxis and, as Machiavelli notes one of the best ways to be allowed to do this - for the Prince's power is never absolute, hence the need for wile - is to play on the moral virtues of those who could stop them. Accumulate natural resources while preaching freedom and peace; praise justice while undermining international law, etc. I do not like what I read, but over 500 years since it was first published The Prince strikes me as an extremely perceptive book. It is not that the leader should be wholly self-serving - for, contrary to some characterisations that is not Machiavelli's argument but if one is to succeed in the community of nations (I use success in the normal sense and not as a statement of personal approval) then ethics should be subservient to power. We may hope for the day when that is not so but at present it is the world in which we live.

Related Links: Online version of Machiavelli's The Prince

The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy's Article on Machiavelli. 

A Scholars & Rogues review of the book.

On David Nutt

It's a digression from the usual subject matter but I want to take a little time looking at the David Nutt story that seems to be running and running. Professor David Nutt was, until recently the chair of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), in effect the Government's chief scientific advisor on drugs policy. If the Guardian is to be believed the story can be summarised thus:

Professor David Nutt, the government's chief drug adviser, has been sacked a day after claiming that ecstasy and LSD were less dangerous than alcohol.

Alan Johnson, the Home Secretary, put forward the following rationale for the decision:

"Professor Nutt was not sacked for his views, which I respect but disagree with," he writes. "He was asked to go because he cannot be both a government adviser and a campaigner against government policy."

The story has been rumbling on and today it has been confirmed that two ACMD council members have resigned with rumours that a mass resignation may follow shortly.The story surprised and angered me to the extent that I was about to write a letter of complaint to my MP on the matter.

However, a little research later and I am somewhat less inclined to make Nutt a martyr.

In recent years the UK has seen Cannabis reclassified from a class C to a class B drug in 2002. Then, last year in Cannabis was again reclassified back to a class C drug, despite the advice against the move by ACMD. Although accepting that cannabis use may cause increased liklihood of psychosis the link was not a strong one. Scientifically speaking, in terms of the medical risk to the individual user, Nutt maintained that Cannabis use was safer than alchohol and tobacco, both of which a legal drugs. The finding, which is hardly unique, certainly raises questions regarding the evidential basis for the reclassification.

If the main thrust of the media's presentation is to be believed this is what Nutt said. If he had I'd currently be writing my letter to my MP for the sacking. For Nutt would have been sacked solely for relaying scientific evidence, as is his duty to do, which, it so happens, would on its own suggest a drugs policy at variance with the one instituted.

But in the article that sparked the issue  it is clear that Nutt went much further than this. He criticised the precautionary principle rationale Jacqui Smith (Johnson's predecessor) put forward in Parliament on grounds other than medical evidence. There are other issues involved in drugs policy other than just the medical risk to users - all of which quite reasonably can feed into a government policy. Of course, Nutt is free to disagree, but he may not do so publicly (on this one matter) while he held the office he did. The tradition of public service impartiality is an important one, and Nutt trangressed that line. Of course, now he has the limelight and is free from restraint he may, and I suspect will, tell the Government exactly why he thinks its so wrong.

And, for the record, in my opinion cannabis should have remained a category C drug and I pretty agree with all the points raised in Nutt's paper. 

Elsewhere ...

Mark Reckons ...

Liberalism the (sort of) Vampire

Review of Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism, Yale University Press, (2006). ISBN: 0300115369.

Walzer begins Politics and Passion with an observation what while empirically evident in all our lives needs to be reiterated again and again in political philosophy; namely, that we all have pluriform identities. Where Walzer differs from others such as Amartya Sen who have dissented from the tendency towards monocultural identities is his summary of how the plurality of affiliations are often involuntary in nature, the clearest example being that which we involuntarily receive from our parents and guardians in our early youth.

In the course of a discussion of international politics that aims to spread an emancipatory ideal (often coterminous with the spread of liberal democracy) Walzer makes the following comment:

a politics committed to transcending group life, breaking the categories of difference, is likely to be ineffective (there are many examples); and it is pretty sure to be nasty and repressive in its own way. Individuals with rights are also individuals with emotions: they have the affiliative passions that go with their practical attachments, and if we want to strengthen their hand, some of the help they need has to come via their own political associations (p. 138).

Liberalism is, argues Walzer in Politics and Passion, a philosophy that does - in a fashion - aim to transcend group life. With the noble (in theory at least) goal of promoting a universal egalititarianism for all inhabitants qua citizens. Walzer is certainly not alone in noting that the problem is that a nation's citizenship (those who seek and are involved in the political process) and its inhabitants are not synonymous. And Liberalism, in acting as though this is not the case, does great damage to its own stated agenda of toleration and respect when it ignores this fact (notwithstanding the very real harm it can do those minorities who are inhabitants but not citizens of a nation). If one could condense Walzer's dissection of Liberalism's ailments it would be this: Liberalism is a vampiric entity that sucks all passion all passion from the political process leaving nothing but an empty shell of a person.

To expand his point Walzer draws attention to the sociologist Lewis Coser's study of Greedy Institutions; that is, groups and organisations that demand everything of their members. Within this category of the greedy institution are many groups disfranchised (sometimes by intent of others, sometimes by their own passivity) - a prime example are groups such as the Amish.

It is here that Walzer differs from the Liberal strategy of asserting individual autonomy at all costs. If the aim of liberalism is to promote egalitarianism then such a heavy-handed approach is heavy-handed and, more importantly from its own perspective, it is counter-productive. We all know the response of a cornered animal when it is threatened, it lashes out. Similarly, a group under constant critique is more likely to close ranks, withdraw, and have its own bonds of solidarity strengthened (incidentally, this is precisely the response Rowan Williams is warning against in his tentative suggestion that Shari enter as a subservient and voluntary avenue in family law disputes between Muslims).

However, in recognising the hard case of bringing often involuntary members of these greedy institutions into the autonomy granted to those of more avowedly plural identities Walzer is not suggesting an ideological free for all (as some unwise Governmental critics of Williams's speech read him as saying) ; it remains the case that Liberalism will always have recourse to coercion, particularly in the case of the greedy institution as Walzer himself hesitantly admits (emphasis in original):

Coercion itself cannot be avoided; civic education does have to be legally mandated and compulsory. And since it challenges the totalizing claims of the religious or ethnic community, it is sure to encounter opposition. Its aim is to allow or encourage the community's children, as many of them as possible, to accept another identity, that is, to think of themselves as responsible and respected participants in democratic decision-making. Citizens of the state can honestly say that they want these children to add citizenship to their existing religious or ethnic self-understanding, not replace the latter with the former (p. 60).

However, as Walzer continues in the passage there is a replacement here: a monocultural traditionalism is replaced by one that incorporates a fuller spectrum of contemporary human existence. The question can legitimately be asked as to whether this necessarily coercive pluralisation of identities betrays the ideal of toleration which in the potted history of liberalism - replete with references to the Peace of Westphalia - is one of its cornerstones? Here is Walzer's response

Maybe, but I am not advocating the total replacement of traditional ways. I don't want to insist that members of the parochial or tribal group be taught to draw up their own life plans without copying from their parents. I mean to be more tolerant than contemporary activist versions of liberalism would allow - without, however, endorsing the illiberal way of life of greedy communities (p. 60-61).

By and large Walzer succeeds in this aim and in the process has produced a compelling analysis not only of the dead-end that is the usual liberal policy of excluding passion from the political terrain but also the delicate and imprecise balancing act that the inclusion of passions creates, particularly as it relates to minorities.

 

On Taking Terrorists at their Word

Review of Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, Yale University Press, (2006). ISBN: 9780300122572.

Back in March 2006 I mentioned Robert Pape's Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism on this blog. Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago conducted argued on the basis of significant research on known instances of suicide terrorism that the motivation for their actions do not come from their any religious convictions they may hold but from a simple aim: to compel foreign invaders to leave geographical areas which the perpetrators believe are their own. Other theories of course exist ranging from "terrorism is a product of global capitalism and the poverty of the majority this creates" to Radical/Jihadist Islam is evil, it's leaders are evil and it wants to destroy the rest of the world because the rest of the world is 'kufr', i.e. not us. Habeck is firmly in the latter category. Habeck's rationale is simple: Islamic terrorists say they do what they do because they hate our unbelief ergo that is why they do it - as though that is the only possible explanation. Now I am sure an argument - in fact a good and possibly convincing argument - could be made to support the thesis but Habeck does not produce one, instead her method is ignore any countering theories and just assume that terrorists are telling the truth when they outline their motivations; there is therefore no reason to to question the motivations of, for example, the Pakistani crowds cheering the 9/11 attacks in their aftermath. Religion and economics or politics are insulated fields. Consequently, Habeck's study is to introduce a survey of Jihadist Ideology and in itself, this is a reasonable introduction although, contrary to Charles Hill's blurb on the book it most certainly is not "the first clear analysis currently available on this topic". Not only is it not the first I have read it is also not the best, that accolade would go to Youssef Choueiri's Islamic Fundamentalism.

Nonetheless, as an introduction to the genealogy of Jihadist thought, particularly the thought of Qutb, Al-Banna and Wahhab then this is an adequate introduction. Perhaps unsurprisingly for a book that highlights the Evil Other motif of Jihadist terrorism it Habeck's thesis is noticeably short on productive commentary on the justifiability of a war on terror or how this war should be waged which, given Habeck's status as a military historian could have been done a lot better. Yes this book is adequate as an introduction to the history of Jihadist thought but beyond that I can't say it is one I would really recommend.

Mosley's Fascism

Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: From Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts to the National Front, Rev ed, I B Taurus, (1998).

There is no doubt that Oswald Mosley was a charismatic and intelligent politician. Prior to reading this work I watched the Mosley - The Complete Series TV series covering Mosley's political career up to 1940.What Jonathan Cake who played Mosley in this piece did so well was to portray the brilliance of Mosley with his arrogance and impulsiveness. Had he played the party-political game I do not think it inconceivable that Mosley could have achieved high office as a Labour minister but the arrogant streak and refusal to bide time put paid to such ambitions.

At the age of 21 Mosley became the youngest member of parliament as a conservative MP, however it was not long before he fell out with the conservative government over their Irish policy, particularly the harsh actions of the Blacks and Tans which Mosley (not alone) considered to be state-sanctioned torture. Mosley subsequently crossed the floor and in 1924 not only joined the Labour Party but expressed sympathy with the party's left by also joining the Independent Labour Party. In the Labour Party Mosley developed a friendship and alliance with Ramsey McDonald and when McDonald formed a government in 1929 he had expected a Cabinet position but, to his disappointment Mosley was appointed Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with responsibility for looking at the nation's unemployment.

It was this commission that was to act as the catalyst for Mosley's extreme future political career. Mosley recommended a relatively radical solution that was both protectionist, aimed at stimulating the economy with public works and was inspired by Keynesian economics. That a party that styled itself as socialist should be so risk-averse. Furious at the lack of respect (read - failure to recognise his greatness) and disillusioned with the party political system as it was Mosley, together with a number of fellow conservative and labour MPs left to create a new party which, imaginatively, the called The New Party.

The New Party still campaigned on a (largely) socialist ticket using as an election manifesto an expanded version of Mosley's memorandum. But because of poor electoral showings and suspicion of the increasingly authoritarian the New Party was disbanded and what came next was the first major explicit fascist political identification in the UK, namely the BUF (the British Fascisti did proceed the BUF but in terms of external influence they were pretty inconsequential). It is here that the first of two of the main aims of Thurlow's work comes into play. There is within academic literature much discussion of generic fascism (one can pick up the gist of the argument here and here). In the introduction to the book Thurlow (page xi, xii) writes of the British Union of Fascists (hereafter BUF)

the BUF produced the most coherent and developed programme of any fascist movement ... it was anti-war, portrayed itself as law abiding engaging only in defensive violence, and for the 1930s had some relatively advanced views on feminism.

Although within a British context discussion of fascism is next to always made in reference to the German experience of German National Socialism Thurlow shows that the BUF in its earlier and most politically potent period had no substantive (policy) connections to Germany. If there were any connections of international fascism to Mosley's BUF (pictured doing a silly salute) it was to Mussolini. It is known that Mussolini was, second to Mosley himself, the key financial contributor to the BUF, that Mosley did meet with Mussolini early in the 1930s and that like Mussolini racialised fascism was not as significant as in Germany.

However much Mosley the BUF considered the BUF (in comparison to continental fascisms) as "fascism minus the violence" with the tail-off of press interest (following a particularly ugly scene involving warring communists and fascists) Mosley soon began using violence to keep in the political eye. Likewise, and here Thurlow never really explains why, Mosley unlike some colleagues in the BUF (e.g, William Joyce and A K Chesterton - cousin of GK) had never been exceptionally anti-semitic but this became a recurring motif in his speeches.

Thurlow continues to complete Mosley's story, including a fascinating chapter on Defence Regulation 18 which (and where have I heard this before?) suspended the right of habeas corpus and imprisoned most of the key players in British fascism without trial even though it is clear they were no threat to national security, as Thurlow shows. Mosley was to try to resurrect his political career post war in the union movement and while - arguably -not a fascist movement (it advocated a pan-european-nation instead of current political nation states) the authoritarian emphasis remained.

Fascism in Britain is not however just a history of the BUF and its impact on then contemporary British society. If it were then it would have achieved its aim. The second edition, published in 1998 offers something more: namely a history and analysis of fascism in post-war Britain. In his analysis of Mosley's attempted political resurrection in his vision for a European Nation then this surely succeeds. Likewise, Thurlow does an able job of analysing the post war conspiratorial and racialised fascisms of other of the main players in the BUF (A K Chesterton et al - a cousin of GK).

The latter chapters deal with the rise of the National Front and thereafter, with the BNP. The fascism these groups present, argues Thurlow, is to be distinguished from that of Mosley. To be sure, no one in post-war British fascism has had the same intellectual substance as Mosley but that does not change the fact Mosley's own fascism was ambiguous. Mosley's fascism was at one point truly a form of national (empire) socialism but at another it was little distinguishable from the paranoid ramblings of the conspiracist theorists. No real account is given for this change and, given Thurlow does not agree that this was just a political manoeuvre on Mosley's part to seek right wing votes it must surely be accounted for. Despite having the largest fascist following at its peak in the UK Mosley's influence on post-war fascism appears to be negligible. Strangely, Thurlow offers very little analysis of why this is the case. Finally, Thurlow offers a premature obituary of British fascism arguing that the inter-group squabbling, Nazi connections and the strong and anti-immigrant legislation of Thatcher et al destroyed the chance of a fascist resurgence. Unfortunately, in the year following this book's publication the BNP gained a new leader and the anti-immigration and law and order ticket , in the recent London elections, a seat.

In contrast to most british fascists Mosley was a man of charisma and intelligence, thankfully these are few and far between. Although lacking a critical edge that at times was needed Thurlow's book is a well-written history of British fascism as it related to Mosley, as a general history of bristish fascism in the current political climate less so. 

Unexpected Praise

I never thought I'd have cause to praise Andy McNab, author of Bravo Two Zero, on this blog but then this happens.

Go Andy!