Over the last week the BBC has been showing Hunter, a two-part pretty standard cop finding terrorists in a race against time drama (readers in the UK can find the programme on iplayer for a limited time. Hunter is not a great show although passable.
What was interesting though was the subject matter: pro-life terrorists. It's not an original point but the presentation of pro-life (anti-abortion) abducting and murdering young children in alleged furtherance of their aim. Some of the reviews of the show suggest that this transparent inconsistency made the plot ludicrous, I disagree. What the contrast raised for me was the question of the perceived relationship between the Fundamentalist and the Terrorist, a relationship often taken particularly by the non-religious to be symbiotic.
It is I think a given that not all fundamentalists are terrorists. However, the reverse, namely all terrorists are fundamentalists is assumed. What the spectre of the pro-life murderer presents us with is a challenge to that view.
The fundamentalist is, according to Giddens (2001: 557-558), one who "believe[s] that only one view of the world is possible and that their view is the correct one: there is no room for ambiguity or multiple interpretations". The birth of the self-confessed fundamentalist in American Protestantism at the beginning of the twentiethth century is indicative of such a move; not only is the approach epistemologically foundationalist but it makes a virtue of its resolute aversion to all caveat and ambiguity. More recently Richard Land, one of the better theological contemporary fundamentalists (which is not exactly a ringing endorsement!), applies fundamentalist logic to the subject of abortion. The dividing line is the sanctity of human life; one is either acknowledges life's sacredness or one participates in the culture of death - there is no via media.
As an aside it is interesting that Peter Singer (2004), whom Land castigates in his essay has made the point that to be pro-life and support the death penalty, for example, is inconsistent. However the point to note is the unambiguity of the position, fundamentalism engages in an action based on perceived universal principles regardless of consequence - teleology is not a relevant factor.
One can put this in terms of a counterfactual argument. Suppose that one could know infallibly that a particular foetus would upon reaching adult maturity become a medical practitioner who over the course of their career would (for the sake of argument) assist hundreds of women in terminating their pregnancies. The fundamentalist, dealing as they do in moral absolutes, unambiguously oppose the termination of this one foetus, irrespective of the 100s of murders (from their perspective) such an act would instantiate.
While the counterfactual and the infallible knowledge may be imagined the logic is not; as the case of Paul Hill (whom I referred to here) shows the aim of saving lives was precisely the rationale used for justifying the murder of Dr John Britton.
It is at this point that the alleged parasitic relationship of terrorism on fundamentalism can be challenged. Although some continue to characterise Hill's actions as those of a "religious fundamentalist" it seems to be that Hill's terrorism (although I am not sure I would in this instance characterise Hill as a terrorist) is not borne of fundamentalism but rather is borne of its rejection. In this instance it was in walking away from the unambiguity of the fundamentalist mindset that murder was conceived.
This is what happens when I watch TV!
References ...
Richard D Land, Abortion and the Culture of Death, in ed. David P Gushee, Christians and Politics Beyond the Culture Wars: An Agenda for Engagement, Baker Books, 2000.
Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 4th Ed, Polity, 2001.
Peter Singer, The President of Good and Evil: Taking George W Bush Seriously, Granta, 2004.
In today's Telegraph 
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